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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers a criticism of the rational actor model in the 
formulation of political theory. A critique is offered of Anthony Downs's 
An Economic Theory of Democracy which was among the earliest works 
attempting to integrate this aspect of economic theory into a political 
modeI.
An encapsulation of the argument of the thesis goes as follows:
There may be systematic biases in individuals' reception and inter­
pretation of information. This can limit the explanatory value of the ra­
tional actor model by causing the decision-making processes predicted by 
the model to differ widely from the actual processes of society. Problems 
with the individual's reception and interpretation of information cause a 
greater uncertainty and hence a greater variance in his decisions.
Factors leading to variance from rational choice include increased 
specialization of labor, level of technology, and time horizons of the 
effects of decisions. Biases can occur both in the way individuals gather 
and receive information and in the way they interpret information.
Further, there is no reason to believe the tacit assumption of the rational 
actor model that individuals' biases w ill "average out" to a rational 
society. Biases may be systematic.
This thesis argues that to more closely approximate the realities 
of the modern polity, models should incorporate elements of social psy­
chology and information theory. Some suggestions regarding this synthesis 
are made.
Information, Rationality, and Politics 
A Critiques of Anthony Downs's 
An Economic Theory of Democracy
Introduction
In 1957, Anthony Downs published An Economic Theory of Democracy, 
a widely regarded book considered a seminal work in formal democratic 
theory.1 This thesis criticizes certain assumptions implicit in Downs's m odel.-  
These assumptions, if  erroneous, might call into question some of the book's 
findings. Downs sought to provide a model of government compatible with 
the general equilibrium theory of economics. His formulation differs from 
that of standard economic models in that government expenditures are treat­
ed as endogenously, rather than exogenously generated.2 For this, his model 
assumes the rationality of individual voters in the same way that economic 
theory assumes the rationality of consumers and producers in the marketplace. 3
The assumption of rational individual behavior in the electorate re­
quires implicit assumptions about the information possessed by citizens. 
Specifically, Downs's spatial competition model assumes that voters are 
aware of the possible policies available to the electorate and that voters 
can be placed along continuums of policy preferences.4 The individual in the 
model faces uncertainty which can be lessened by expenditure on information. 
His dilemma is how best to reduce the cost of getting information and how 
best to use the information he has. Downs explicitly assumes that an in -
5
crease in a person's information expenditure w ill reduce his uncertainty.
Downs does not consider the possibility that the structure of the
2
3polity's information sources may in some cases cause increased information 
expenditures to lead the voter farther from rational choice due to biases in 
and filtering of the information he receives. There may be situations in 
which information can be obtained only from one whose interests run 
counter to giving unbiased information.
Consider an everyday example of how this might occur. Someone 
whose yard rake is broken may choose to have it repaired. His understanding 
of rake repair is probably sufficient to estimate accurately the cost of such 
a job. A great deal of information is available both from his own past 
experiences and from readily available price and quality comparisons from 
other repairmen and consumers.
On the other hand, a man with an automobile in need of repair may 
not be as fortunate as the man with the rake. Because he has little  know­
ledge on the mechanics of automobiles, he may be in some sense at the 
mercy of the repairman. He may be charged excessively for the quality of 
the work done. He may pay for unnecessary work. According to the common 
criteria of welfare economics, the case of the yard rake provides an 
efficient allocation of resources while excessive payment to the mechanic 
misallocates resources. Consider a case in which the mechanic discards a 
part not in need of repair. The car owner's welfare is reduced because 
he has less money to spend on other goods and has gained nothing for his 
expenditure f Productive resources are diverted from other uses into produc­
ing an unneeded part.
4Such situations as this are at the heart of debates on the relative 
merits of market and planning economic systems. The car owner may 
reduce his costs by seeking competitive estimates, talking with friends 
who have knowledge of car repairs, reading consumer reports, and so on.
He reduces costs of information by seeking the most efficient system of 
gathering knowledge. This is the same way in which the voter in Downs's 
book seeks efficient information networks. The citizen cannot be omniscient. 
There is no need for him to learn everything about automobile mechanics.
In terms of mathematical statistics, he wants an information system which 
w ill most efficiently collapse his perceptions around the truth.
Thomas Jefferson wrote of the virtues of a simple agrarian society.7 
!t would not be unrealistic to argue that some of his arguments fit well 
into the framework of information considerations. In the Jeffersonian vision, 
the citizen would be best prepared to enjoy liberty if  he had a solid 
understanding of the things around him which affected his life .
The modern Western polity bears little  resemblance to the Jeffersonian 
ideal. Much of the information about major factors in a person's life is 
unknown to him. Information is specialized. Complex organizations act as 
information-processing mechanisms. Each individual within these organizations 
possesses some knowledge unknown to anyone else. O f course, this is not 
by itself new, but it has been argued that the degree of the partitioning 
of information across individuals has increased dramatically!
5A bureaucrat in charge of some program may know the costs and 
benefits of his program in a way that no one else knows. Further, if  he 
is the only source of some of the information about that program, then 
it may be very costly for anyone else to try to estimate the value of the 
program independently. In some sense the worker within the bureaucracy 
becomes something akin to the automobile mechanic mentioned earlier.
The cost of getting information may be more expensive than the information 
could ever be worth. It can be argued that knowledge held by one person 
or by a small group of people can have a power similar to that of a re­
source held by a monopolist. There is no reason to believe that a rational 
person with such information would not use it in his own self-interest10 
(unless the case of altruism is pleaded).
The liberal belief that the individual is best able to judge his own 
preferences is the ethical basis for the doctrine of individual sovereignty11 
It would follow that in an ethical sense, it is best for the individual to 
have the broadest possible awareness of the effects of his choices. Part of 
the doctrine also holds that the individual's judgments should come as much 
as possible from himself-not from a king or state or feudal lord.12This 
paper argues that Downs falls short in differentiating between decisions 
made by an individual and those imposed upon him by others. It also 
seeks to examine some of the processes which make up decision-making 
in cases of both markets and controlled situations.
Following is an outline of the course this thesis w ill take:
61) Chapter OnerDowns's theory w ill be outlined with a concentration 
on those aspects related to the previous discussion.
2) Chapter Two: This w ill discuss the process of individual decision­
making (given a fixed set of preferences). There w ill be discussion of the 
quantity and accessibility and the cost of information.
3) Chapter Three: !t is argued that the specialization of labor, pro­
duction, and knowledge in society has increased the cost of information and 
reduced the probability of securing desired information. Here w ill be 
discussed some of the ramifications of this change.
4) Chapter Four: It w ill be argued that individual biases in information 
may not be randomly distributed across the polity. Instead, it may be skewed 
in a way that systematically distorts individual decisions. Given this, it 
becomes logical for the holders of some information to use it ways serving 
self-interests but at the expense of others. It w ill be discussed why a small 
number of actors with particular information may act in ways resembling 
economic models of oligopoly.
7Notes to the Introduction
1. In a 1965 foreword to Downs's book, Stanley Kelley, Jr. wrote,
"Some years from now I shall be surprised if  Downs' work is not recog­
nized as the starting point of a highly important development in the 
study of politics; its influence is already considerable and continues to 
grow. " Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: 
Harper and Row, Publishers, In c ., 1957).
2. Ib id ., p .3.
3. Ib id ., p . 7.
4 . These continuums srepresent the various levels of a particular policy 
which may be chosen by the government ( i .e .  expenditure levels or 
levels of activ ity ).
5 .  Ib id ., p . 215.
6 . Welfare here is synonymous with u tility . See Ib id ., p. 17 for a 
fuller explanation of the social welfare function.
7 . "..the strong allurements of great cities to those who have any turn
for dissipation, threatans to make them here, as in Europe, the sinks of 
voluntary misery." Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 
ed. Albert Ellery Bergh, vo l. 13 (Washington: The Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial Association, 1907), pp. 272ff.
88 . Victor Thompson refers to this as the "categorization of data."
Victor A . Thompson/ Modern Organization (New York: Alfred A . Knopf, 
1965).
9. See John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston:
Houghton M ifflin  C o ., 1967), pp. 27-28 , 407-409 , 414-415.
1 0 . Downs quotes John C . Calhoun: ”That constitution of our nature
which makes us feel more intensely what affects us directly than what 
affects us indirectly through others, necessarily leads to conflict between 
individuals. Each, in consequence has a greater regard for his own safe­
ty or happiness than for the safety or happiness of others: and, where these 
come into opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of the others to 
his own." John C . Calhoun, "Disquisition on Government," Public 
Opinion and Propaganda, ed. by Katz, Cartwright, Eldersveld, and Lee 
(New York: The Dryden Press, 1954),. p. 15.
11. See Robert A . Nisbet, The Quest for Community (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 224 for a discussion of the evolution 
of 'his tenet.
12. See Adolf A . Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C . Means, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1932), pp. 289-299.
Chapter 1 
Downs: An Outline
*n this chapter, an outline is provided explaining the central points 
of Downs's theory. Especially important are the points relating to the spa­
tial competition model used by Downs and essential to the critique. 1
Downs sought to provide an economic theory of the state as a method 
of integrating government into the general equilibrium model of the econo­
my. Normally, government is treated in such models only as an exogenous 
variable. Downs formulates a model defining politics as the selection and 
enforcement of the preferences of individuals. Incorporated in this is the 
assumption of individual, self-interested rationality borrowed from economic 
theory. It is postulated that government maximizes the self-interest of 
government officials rather than some notion of social welfare. Voting 
and political decision-making both are determined by individuals maximizing 
personal u tility . 3 The model in itia lly  is deterministic, but this is later 
tempered by adding uncertainty. Both voters and politicians in the model 
calculate the marginal costs and benefits of purchasing information and 
make decisions accordingly.1* From this analysis, Downs derives a set of 
hypotheses. 5
Following is a more complete synopsis of An Economic Theory of 
Democracy:
9
Downs first introduces the assumption of individual rationality which 
is the cornerstone of the theory. The theorist, he says, makes assumptions 
regarding individual behavior which may or may not be true in the real 
world, but which he believes have explanatory power regarding the real 
world. The rational individual in the theory is one who has an indifference 
map such that he is able to calculate his goals, given a set of circum­
stances.6 He calculates the most reasonable way to meet his goals and pursues 
them in that manner. Importantly, the goals themselves are irrelevant to the 
definition of rationality; no ethical or positive judgment is offered regarding 
desires. "Rationality" refers only to the means employed toward the desired 
goals. Downs offers a simplifying assumption that individuals only use the 
political devices for political purposes. In other words, no one w ill vote 
for a party because that action w ill please a spouse or for any other non- 
political reason. Downs calls this single-minded individual "homo politicus" 
after the utilitarians' "homo economicus, " the heartless profit maximizer with 
no motives beyond personal enrichment.
Downs assumes that governments seek to maximize political support. He 
assumes periodic elections at regular intervals, unlimited freedom of action by 
government within the bounds of the constitution, and a prohibition against 
government interference with the actions of other political actors. No re­
strictions may be placed on freedom of speech, freedom to campaign for 
public office, or freedom to criticize the government. Early in the book, 
he assumes perfect information , though this assumption is later relaxed by 
the introduction of uncertainty. Government is introduced as a specialized
11
agency within the division of labor, no different from any other specialized 
body. Government's purpose is the enforcement of decisions in cases of 
disputes within a geographical area. It holds a monopoly on this power 
and has authority over all other organizations and individuals.
The political party is the organization which competes for control of 
the government. It is defined as a coalition of individuals whose purpose 
is to gain or hold control of the governing apparatus by legal means.
Downs rejects any organism!c explanation of party behavior— theory?, 
treating organizations as single-minded entities— but considers the party as 
something in between an amorphous mass of individuals and a unit? He 
considers the party a "team" of individuals who agree on goals so that 
each member of a party has the same views as any other member of the 
party. Members seek not to maximize party u tility , but individual self- 
interest. This part of the model is derived from Adam Smith's assertion 
that social good comes primarily from private motivations ; Downs says 
this is as true of politics as of economics! °ln his model, the private mo­
tivation of politicians is to gain or hold political office. This is accomplished 
by providing social goods the party believes w ill attract the votes of the 
electorate. Thus, what are generally considered the ends of government 
are held to be the means parties use ro accomplish the private ends of 
their members.11
The voter, similarly has private ends .with respect to government.
He calculates the benefits he believes he is receiving from government 
policies. He also calculates the benefits he believes he would receive
12
from alternative policies. Benefits are defined in terms of utility  income.
This includes not only personal goods the voter receives from the policies, 
but also whatever items he may choose to include in his own goals(i.e. 
satisfaction from feeding the starving overseas). He calculates the utilities  
he expects to receive from each party's probable policies and votes for 
the party giving the highest expected utility  income. These calculations 
are based on a combination of promises of the parties, past performance by 
the parties, and subjective beliefs regarding the future. Important to later 
discussion, Downs also considers a possible "party differential threshold."
This supposes that a voter's party differential calculation is not a continuous 
function but a discrete one. Below a certain differential, he is indifferent.12 
Ultimately, Downs wrote, the voter's evaluation depends on the information 
he has on policies and the relation between the policies with which he is 
familiar and the relation between these policies and his personal goals.
Parties in the model make calculations similar to those of individuals,
1 3
based on marginal costs and benefits. The hypothesis is that governments 
alter policies marginally so that marginal gain of votes, from increased ser­
vices just equals the marginal loss of votes from increased taxation. This is 
equivalent to the rational entrepreneur in economics who produces at a level 
at which the last increment of revenue equals the last increment of cost.
Following this marginal policy, the party in power w ill seek to make 
its decisions subject to a hypothetical poll of the level of expenditures 
desired by voters. In a world of certainty, however, the governing party
must be concerned with the "Arrow problem" and certain strategic coalitions 
of minority parties I HThese may be explained as follows:
The Arrow problem provides that given certain arrays of preferences 
of individuals, no democratic voting strategy can resolve issues such that 
a majority of the voters are satisfied. Consider the following preference 
array: A ,B , and C are voters. f ,g , and h are possible policies. Preferences 
are:
VOTER
CHOICE
A B c
First f g h
Second g h f
Third h f g
No alternative enjoys majority support for first choice. Any policy chosen 
faces a majority of the electorate which prefers another particular policy. 
For example, if  policy f is chosen, voters B and C prefer policy h. Here, 
the only task of an opposition party is to wait until such a situation arises, 
endorse the policy preferred by the majority, and wait to be elected.
Crucial to the argument is the equality of franchise which ranks the 
preferences of each person equally1. 5Downs relaxes this assumption by intro­
ducing the "passionate m ajority." A passionately held minority view may 
prevail over a lukewarm majority view because of the political interplay 
resulting from this difference in intensity of views. A bargaining process 
may affect the government's estimate of the costs and benefits(in terms of
14
votes) of a policy. This process may result in markedly different outcomes 
than one where there is no variance of opinion intensity.
Uncertainty is introduced into the model because in the real world 
there is no sure knowledge regarding the course of future events and be­
cause knowledge of past and present events is lim ited. Downs considers 
most uncertainty removable through the acquisition of information but 
considers some (such as knowledge of future events) intrinsically uncertain.
He differentiates between lack of contextual knowledge and lack of infor­
mation.16 The former is an inability to use data, available or not. The latter 
is a lack of data one could use.
The voter may be uncertain because he is unaware that utility  in­
comes have changed. He may be uncertain what actions have been taken
and he may be unaware of possible results of government actions. He may 
be unaware of what effect he himself has on government decisions, and
he may be unaware of how others plan to vote.
Political parties may be uncertain because future states of the economy 
cannot be predicted, because politicians are unsure of possible effects of 
policies, the influence of certain voters, and the policies of other political 
parties, and because it is uncertain how much information is required to 
influence voters.
Reducing uncertainty requires additional information, and that re­
quires expenditures in time and other resources. So, some individuals find 
it in their interests to be politically active, and some do not, depending 
on their indifference maps. Because a voter may wish to be informed, if  not
active, he may look to political leadership for information. Similarly, 
government decentralizes its own information-gathering in order to reduce 
uncertainty about voters' preferences. According to Downs, the inequality 
of political knowledge, political activism, and political influence modifies 
the equality implied by universal suffrage.
Because voters are attracted to particular parties and leaders in this 
quest for information, ideologies develop as a way of avoiding an infinity  
of choices and, hence, the Arrow problem. The voter no longer needs to 
be informed about everything affecting his u tility  income.
Downs represents this clustering of views as placing voters along a 
left-right continuum of policy. This is represented by a spatial competition
1 7
model borrowed from Harold Hotelling. This model was written as a 
theory of oligopolistic behavior. It demonstrated that two mobile competitors 
(think of hot dog stands on a boardwalk), given a population distribution, 
w ill both tend to move toward the mean of that distribution. By this hypo­
thesis, two parties w ill tend to move toward the center of a political spec­
trum. Downs analyzes this tendency in both a two-party system and a 
multi-party system with parties distributed along the ideological continuum.
He argues that this distribution is the primary determinant of the nation's 
politics. No attempt is made to explain the origin of particular distributions; 
that is assumed to result from personal preferences. Changes in the distribution
resulting from changes in taste and changes in the electorate are major
1 8
events historically and politically. Also, parties attempt through persuasion 
to move the population distributions. Downs provides an extensive discussion
16
of the peculiar problems of multi-party democracies, but that discussion is 
largely irrelevant to this thesis.
The process of citizens becoming informed is crucial to Downs's model. 
Individuals limit the amount of information they acquire before making de­
cisions. Information is distributed by individuals who have their own self- 
interests (which w ill, in general, not coincide with those of any particular 
voter). So, the voter exposes himself to competing information sources in 
order to compare data. He tries to find sources whose values are like his 
own. He wants enough information to make an intelligent decision, but no 
more. The process of choosing among sources is trial and error, checking 
occasionally for accuracy. The voter equates what he believes is the margin­
al benefit of additional information with the marginal cost of obtaining it.19 
People try to increase personal utility  by decreasing the costs of obtaining 
information. This results in further specialization of labor. Professional 
journalists, political agents, interest groups, political parties, and the 
government itself become specialized data disseminators.
Where voters are too dissatisfied with any political choices, they may 
rationally choose to abstain from voting. Political parties have to consider 
not only the population distribution in ideology, but also how many voters 
are lost from the election system itself because of a given policy. The
voter practicing rational abstention simply finds the party differential
2 0
threshold too high to warrant voting.
*7
Notes to Chapter 1
1. Downs, p. 115.
2. Ib id ., p. 28.
3 . Ib id ., pp. 21-50 .
4. Ib id ., p. 52.
5 . Ib id ., pp. 295-300.
6 . An indifference map is a mathematical or geometrical representation
of the individual's preferences. It is roughly synonymous with "utility  
function." See ib id ., pp. 36-37 .
7 . Ib id ., p. 5 .
8 . Ib id ., p . 62.
9 . Ib id ., p. 15; also see James Buchanan, "The Pure Theory of
Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political 
Economy 57 (December, 1949): 496-505.
10. "Man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren,
and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence o n ly .. .
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker that we expect our dinner, but from this regard to their own 
self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their 
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their 
advantage," Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Modern Library Edition
18
(New York: The Modern Library, 1937), p. 14.
11 . Downs, p . 28.
12. Ib id ., p. 46.
13. Ib id ., p. 28.
14. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New  
York: John W iley and Sons, In c .; 1951), ch. 1. Tullock wrote that, 
"Arrow is interested in the question of whether some given method of 
voting w ill in every conceivable case, produce a satisfactory result.
He proves that there is no voting rule which w ill meet this test in 
choosing between three or more alternatives. He does not, however, 
disprove the existence of a voting rule which functioned unexception- 
ably for 99999999999999999999999999999 cases out of each 100000000- 
000000000000000000000...
...A rro w  was the first to dare to challenge the traditional theory 
of democracy by saying that no voting rule leading to rule by 'the  
w ill of the majority’ was possible." James M« Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 334.
15. Downs, p . 64.
16. Ib id ., p. 79 .
17. Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," The Economic 
Journal 39 (1929): 41 -57 .
18. Downs, p. 128.
19
T9. Ib id ., pp. 214-216.
20. Ib id ., p c 261.
Chapter 2 
Introduction to the Critique
In the critique which comprises the remainder of this thesis, An Eco­
nomic Theory of Democracy is criticized because its particular form of the 
rational individuality assumptions may reduce the book's descriptive powers. 
This critique argues that it is the information structure of the society which 
is inadequately represented, and that this structure is critical to the way 
a polity operates. Downs implicitly assumes that information, while imperfect, 
is at least distributed in a more or less random fashion so that increased 
information necessarily means better decision-making.
This is analogous to some terms used in statistics. A scientist begins 
an hypothesis with intuition and incomplete data. Before he collects more 
data, any inferences he makes w ill be subject to great variance. He can 
never gather all available data, but he collects the information to  some 
point at which his findings can be considered "significant." 1 Statistical 
models require that tradeoffs be made between bias in estimation and 
efficiency of the estimator. A biased estimator may be useful if its 
expected value is in some sense "close" to the true mean and if  it collapses 
around the truth more quickly than any unbiased estimator. A major task of 
the scientist is to determine when he has enough information to satisfy his 
needs; another is to determine the optimal tradeoff between bias and
20
21
effic iency.
The voter in a democracy can be viewed as following a similar 
procedure. He cannot possibly learn all that would be helpful in making 
his decisions. So, he must determine the optimal amount of information to 
get. Also, he must balance between sources which are biased but relatively  
accurate in news content against those which are unbiased but whose accura­
cy is subject to wide variance(bias vs. efficiency).
There is a third statistical characteristic analogous to the political
problem— consistency. A consistent estimator is one in w h ich , as the 
amount of information becomes very great, becomes unbiased and variance 
reduces to nothing. An inconsistent estimator w ill not co’ lapse around the 
truth, even as the amount of information becomes enormous. The analogous 
state of affairs for the voter would be one in which his "estimator" of the 
truth on a particular policy comes from sources in such a way that even 
great expenditures on information w ill not move him closer to the truth.
A common such example in political literature is the cost and benefit
of military hardware. A voter may receive relatively unbiased but inefficient 
information by reading newspapers. But, if  he wants more complete data, he 
may only be able to secure them from military sources. Such sources are 
likely to be heavily biased. It would not be in their interests to divulge 
all information, so they do not do so. The result is that a citizen seeking 
the truth on such a question may not find it useful to collect more data.
The assumption of rational individuality does not recognize this 
problem in information dissemination. The assumption has roots in
22
Nineteenth Century liberalism, utilitarianism, and welfare economics.
It has been considered a va lid (if not necessary) tool in economics.
Milton Friedman argued for its value because consumers and entrepreneurs
2
seem to act "as if" they were obeying economic laws rationally* It w ill 
be argued in this thesis that the way this methodology is used here requires 
an assumption that the polity's information sources are diverse and decen­
tralized. The argument for use of this methodology in economics is that 
the market process provides a relatively efficient disseminator of information, 
allowing "equilibrium" prices to be approximated. John Kenneth Galbraith  
argued that in the case of oligopoly this information system(the price sys-
3
tern) breaks down. His argument was that in what he termed the planning 
sector, prices were no longer market signals but simply figures administered 
by the firms. Further, he argued, the presence of vast sums of advertising 
revenues overwhelmed other information sources. Friedrich A . Hayek argued 
that a socialist planned society could not maximize the utilities of individu­
als because no single agency(i.e . the government) could handle the mass 
of information necessary for the operation of an efficient marketplace.
The government in a planned society would be overloaded with information. 
The question then, is whether, as Galbraith said, society is already planned 
and whether this distorts information in the way Hayek predicted a planned 
economy would. Downs's model assumes an availability  of information as it 
would be in a decentralized market, not a society in any sense planned.
This thesis w ill criticize this assumption based on the following propositions^
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1)The rationality assumption is based on an information structure with 
a high degree of decentralization. Few would argue that individuals are 
actually rational (in the theoretical sense) or that they possess perfect in­
formation. Downs assumes that individuals may be off a bit in their voting 
decisions, but that the system as a whole w ill average out to rationality 
by a law of large numbers. It is argued here that some biases in the 
decision-making may not be random, but may be instead systematic.
2) "his thesis doesn't question the ethical assertion that preferences 
are not subject to questions of rationality. But, how an individual sees 
the options open to him may alter his choices. He may prefer A to B, in 
which case he chooses A . But, if  there is an option C which he prefers to 
both, but of which he is unaware, then is his choice of A rational in the 
context of Downs? The relevant question is which system provides the most 
efficient disseminator of this information?
3) Downs doesn't considers strategic introduction of information biases 
into a polity. Here it is argued that certain institutional structures may 
foster such biases by creating monopolies and oligopolies of information.
By these terms, to be explored more fully later, it is meant that particular 
information is held only by one or a few agents and that these agents may 
be able to exact some profit from this monopoly.
The critique which follows w ill cover these and other arguments in 
d eta il. First, a model of individual choice w ill be presented assuming that 
individual choice is not deterministic but is partly the result of a probability
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distribution based on the information structure of the polity. This model is 
compared with Downs's assumption of individual rationality.
Secondly, it is argued that competitive processes are required to insure 
that, on average, an individual w ill make rational choices, information must 
be available in a way that he is as likely to vary in one direction from the 
truth as another in his perceptions. !t is argued that a more specialized and 
technological society w ill be more likely to systematically bias individuals' 
perceptions.
"hirdly, the sources of individual bias w ill be divided into two types—  
those resulting from biases in available information and those resulting from 
biases in cognitive processes. Examples of both w ill be given.
Fourth, the cumulative effects of of individual biases on the polity as 
a whole w ill be considered. A society of individuals with different tastes 
and preferences w ill be considered in this context, "his section w ill focus on 
Downs's use of Hotelling's spatial competition model.
Finally, it w ill be argued that monopoly of information is not necessary 
to precipitate these effects. The questions raised in the thesis w ill be related 
to economic models of oligopoly.
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Chapter 3
Uncertainty and the Rational Individual
This section relaxes the deterministic assumption of individual rationality, 
replacing it with a probability distribution. Now, even with a fixed set of 
preferences, an individual might be led to make a different choice, depending 
on which information he receives, and how he interprets it .  The individual's 
preference probability distribution is derived and it is compared with Downs's 
deterministic rational individual.
Downs lists five of Arrow's assumptions about the rational individual.2 
They are: "(1) He can always make a decision when confronted with a range 
of alternatives; (2) He ranks all the alternatives facing him in order of his 
preference in such a way that each is either preferred to, indifferent to, or 
inferior to each other; (3) His preference ranking is transitive; (4) He always 
chooses from among the possible alternatives that which ranks highest in his 
preference ordering; and (5) He always makes the same decision each time 
he is confronted with the same alternatives. A ll rational decision-makers in 
our model — including political parties, interest groups, and government—  
exhibit the same qualities. "
"■"his thesis diverges from the last of the five assumptions Downs makes.
It is different because of the information problem. That is, even faced with the 
same information, cognitive limitations can lead the individual to different
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choices. The reason for this is demonstrated graphically in Figures 1 and 2 .
Figure 1 shows the standard curves used in indifference analysis and a 
transformation curve representing the productive capabilities of a polity. Here 
a two-dimensional figure is employed, but the analysis is no less valid for 
n dimensions. X and y , the two axes, represent two items of public policy.
A frequently used example is that o f "guns and butter." Let x represent guns 
and y butter. The transformation curve, which is the one concave to the 
origin, represents the limiting combinations of guns and butter available to 
society. At any point on the curve, a ll resources are being employed for use 
in making guns and butter. Any point within 
the curve represents a possibility, but one 
in v/hich resources are not all being used, 
or are being used inefficiently. Any point on 
the outside of the curve represents a combina­
tion impossible for society to produce because 
of insufficient resources.
The indifference curves represent the 
preferred combinations of guns and butter for 
individual i .  A ll points on are preferred 
to a ll points on Uq , and all points on are preferred to a ll points on Uj 
and so forth. There is an indifference curve passing through each point on 
the graph.
Empirical evidence suggests convex indifference curves and a concave
Figure 1
P(x)
Figure 2 *R
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transformation curve. Some resources are better suited for the production 
of guns and some for butter. !t is assumed that resources are utilized  
where they are most productive. Presumably, the previous increment of 
resources devoted to the production of butter w ill be at least as productive 
as the next increment. Hence the concave transformation curve. Similarly, 
commodities seem to decline in marginal value for consumers as they become 
increasingly satisfied with their holdings. Hence, there are convex utility  
curves.
Given these curves, the individual in Figure 1 would, if  rational, 
choose point R because this is the single combination of guns and butter 
possible at his level.
Figure 2 shows individual i's probability distribution for x alone.
Since this is a deterministic model and all of Downs's assumptions are 
implicitly accepted, the individual w ill always choose the level of guns 
found in bundle R. In Figure 2, the x-axis represents the level of guns, 
and the y-axis represents the probability of choosing any given level of 
guns. In this case, there is a one hundred percent chance of choosing 
level R and a zero percent chance of choosing any other level. Translat­
ing this into political terms, we would expect individual i to support a 
party endorsing combination R and to vote against a party endorsing any 
other combination.
This analysis can also be extended to other pairings of public goods. 
For instance, the axes may represent production versus pollution control or
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education versus defense. It can represent different policies on allocating 
the costs of goods policies. This formulation can also be extended to 
discrete functions, such as yes or no questions , but that w ill not be done 
here. The analysis is essentially the same, but the mathematics is a good 
deal more complex.
The introduction of uncertainty into the individual's decision-making, 
though, transforms the certainty of selecting point R into a distribution of 
decision probabilities more complex than that in Figure 2. The information 
the individual needs to choose his optimum point is not readily available 
or readily discernible. A later section of the thesis w ill deal with the 
specific ways in which the information can be flawed, but here only the 
distribution itself is of concern.
^he problem can be stated as follows: Out of a mass of information 
far beyond the cognitive limitations of any individual , a choice must be 
made. Information is filtered by a set of random and strategically initiated 
processes and the individual cannot possibly know which process w ill most 
efficiently lead him to his optimal utility  point. Depending on which 
information is received and which is utilized, the individual , even with 
fixed tastes and values, w ill probably not judge accurately the transformation 
curve representing the society's available choices. In effect, a nearly infinite 
set of "phantom" transformation curves can be derived from the information 
available, and for each possible curve , there is an optimal point regarding
3
the individual's indifference map# The set of a ll these points forms a 
distribution of possible choices which may be represented in a manner
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similar to the simple diagram in Figure 2 . Technically/ Arrow's fifth condition 
is still true, but only under improbable circumstances.
If the individual perceives the same transformation curve on two occa­
sions, his values w ill lead him to choose the same optimum in both cases.
However, the likelihood of the same information reaching him on two occa­
sions, and the likelihood that he w ill 
interpret it in precisely the same manner 
on two occasions is remote. Figures 3 and
4 demonstrate this assertion. In Figure 3, 
the indifference curves of an individual | 
are represented . The true set of possibili­
ties for society is represented by the dark 
transformation curve. The optimum the in-3 
dividual chooses is again point R. But,
there are a number of phantom transfor­
mation curves represented as w e ll. These
are seen as the lighter curves concave to the origin. Each of these results 
from flawed information reaching j or misperceptions on his part. Each of
these curves produces a phantom optimum represented by S, T, and V . At
5 and T,the individual is led to underestimate the capabilities of society.
Hence, he w ill accept the position of a party which promises too lit t le .
On the other hand, at point V  he overestimates the powers of the govern­
ment and may be persuaded to vote against any incumbent because no party
Y
Figure 3
Figure 4
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can ever live up to his expectations.
These three phantom curves are merely representative of a vast number 
of possible curves. For a better idea of this, Figure 3 also has a large 
number of points distributed throughout. Each of these shows the tangency 
of yet another phantom transformation curve and one of his indifference 
curves. Figure 4 shows one possible probability' distribution regarding Policy 
x . In this particular diagram, the mode falls at the point of rational choice, 
there is no reason a priori for believing that this w ill be so. In fact, it w ill 
be shown that under certain condi­
tions, it w ill not.
Downs explicitly assumes that 
the information problem is one of 
costs; increased expenditures on in­
formation or reduced costs w ill con­
sistently improve an individual's 
probability of choosing approximately what he would choose acting rationally 
under perfect information.
Figure 5 represents information which provides a consistent estimator 
of the truth for individual k . As information expenditures increase (or costs 
decrease) the variance of the individual's probability distribution decreases. 
The distribution consistently collapses around the truth. In the lim it, we 
have a situation as in Figure 2 , where the distribution is a mass point.
1
P(x)
0 Figure 5
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Downs recognizes the limits of knowledge in the uncertain nature of 
future events, but otherwise he asserts that “most uncertainty is removable 
through the acquisition of information, if  a sufficient quantity of data is 
availab le ."  He sees information procurement as a process of utilizing  
scarce resources. In his model, voters reduce information costs by designating 
certain agents (reporters) within the division of labor to accumulate informa­
tion for them. The citizen's chief problem is choosing the proper reporters. 
The individual scans competing information (e .g . from competing newspapers) 
and develops a system of checking the similarity of his views with the 
reporting in particular publications. On the basis of the quality of past 
reporting, ha makes decisions concerning which publication he w ill read.
Downs's citizens strive , according to these rules, to reduce the costs 
of producing information, a process analogous to increasing the efficiency of 
a statistical estimator.He describes a stream of "free" ( i .e .  costly only in 
time) information offered by political parties, professional publishers, interest
groups, and other private citizens as well as from production and consump-
5tion decisions. From these sources, an information-gathering mechanism 
closely replicating his own set of values is established. Importantly, this 
system is alleged to have "sufficient internal plurality so that its parts can
be used as checks upon each other's accuracy and deviation from his own
6
selection principles." This is tantamount to assuming an "invisible hand" 
for data-gathering— a set of counteracting powers which lead the individual
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toward a rational decision.
This assumption ignores the possibility of a monopoly of information.
One source may manipulate a ll the data streaming to the reporters . Downs 
only briefly mentions the biases inherent in what he terms "subsidized" in­
formation, such as advertising. He assumes that the division of labor and 
pluralism have powers those systems might not possess. Those powers are the 
supposed tendencies for the system to provide relatively unbiased information 
from specialists in the division of labor. Downs explicitly  assumes that such 
checks and balances exist in the information system of a polity. He asserts 
that the personal reputations of reporters w ill lead to establishing measures
7
of re liab ility . Specialization, to a great extent, can make this a very 
fa llib le  measure .
Chief officials of institutions, for example, may have information known 
to no others. The information may be of a complex enough nature that it 
takes a lifetime o^ understand. Opinions of the official's peers may not 
provide anyone else with a judge of the quality of materials he dispenses 
because it is not in their interests to provide this information. Reputations 
in complex organizations can come not only from quality of work but also 
from ability to avoid critical evaluations. It is in ths self-interest of the 
executive to give away information which helps him or his organization. It is 
not in his interest to give out damaging information about his organization.
Yet there may be no check to which reporters may turn. There may be no 
one else in the world possessing the information which can more accurately
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depict society's transformation curve. Such a bottleneck of information w ill 
not allow reporters to increase the quality of the information by increased
g
expenditures. The more that is purchased, the more it w ill be biased 
toward the institution's viewpoint.
Downs's assumption can be represented by Figure 6 . The random distri­
bution of information w ill automatically collapse around the truth and the 
individual's choice w ill tend toward his rational choice as he collects more 
information. In the diagram,
I * and I ' * represent biased 
sources whose competition tends 
to guide the individual to 
rational choice. If one gains,
the other loses, so vigorous
Figure 6
rivalry occurs in which the sources demonstrate the weak points in each 
other's reporting. From this, the truth can be sorted.
In summary, in this chapter, it has been shown that the information 
problem for the individual can be stated in terms of statistical inference. 
Given the rational individuality assumption, his decision probability function 
is a mass point . Relaxing this assumption, his decision possibilities are dis­
tributed as a function of the level of a particular policy and depend on 
the quality of information he receives. Information problems causing 
variance in his probability function may originate with the data he receives 
or with his own cognitive processes. Downs assumes away these problems
35
based on further assumptions that rivalry exists between information reporters. 
They may in fact derive their information from some central source, leading 
him away from rational decision-making.
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Notes to Chapter 3
1. This model is deterministic in the sense that any time the
individual faces the same situation, he w ill arrive at the same solution.
This is fairly typical of a number of economic models.
2 . Downs, p. 6 . See Arrow, chs. 1 and 2 for a fuller description.
3 . “Phantom1' is used here to describe what an individual might
perceive as society's transformation curve, given particular circumstances 
and a particular information structure. It is not the same as the true 
transformation curve. There are a near-infinite number of the former, 
only one of the latter.
4 . Ib id ., p. 77.
5 . Ib id ., pp. 221-225.
6 . Downs, p. 218.
7 . Ib id ., p. 231.
8 . "Bottleneck" refers figuratively to a stage in the path of the
information flow at which the absence of competitive forces allows the 
individual transmitting the data at that point to have some control over 
which information is disseminated and which is not.
Chapter 4 
Competition and Information Skewing
!n this chapter, competition between information sources is defined and 
discussed in some d eta il. An information source in this context is the ultimate 
source of data, such as the developer of a particular technology, or a gov­
ernment agency overseeing a technologically defined sector of the economy, 
or any other ultimate producer of information. The definition of competition 
employed here Is analogous to that in the economic definition of a competi­
tive market. Here it is information, rather than a physical resource , which 
is the scarce resource in question.
It is argued here that if  information sources in a sector of interest 
are few in number or monopolized, they w ill tend to collect a form of 
economic rents from those who have use of the information. This w ill include 
a discussion of those types of situations where information monopoly or 
oligopoly might occur. It is based on Tibor Scitovsky's definitions of the 
informed and uninformed markets.
Scitovsky compares the perfectly competitive economic market with the
market characterized by a breakdown of competitive forces. The former m axi-
2
mizes the utility  of society's individuals and attains a Pareto optimum.
No one's welfare can be increased without decreasing someone else's. "his
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happens through the action of competitive forces— Adam Smith's "invisible 
hand" — by which greed and mistrust of people paradoxically lead society
3
to its greatest attainable good.
The monopolistic market is characterized by the "exploitation" of 
those having to purchase from the monopolist. The result is fewer goods 
and higher prices . Here it is argued that an information source should be 
expected to exploit his advantage, and it is considered why he w ill be able 
to do so. One important note: it is not inconsistent here to assume that an 
information w ill be expected to act rationally when it is argued that the ine* 
dividual voter w ill not. Perhaps the problem is definitional. The rationality 
of an information source or individual is considered bounded by the informa­
tion he has. ""here is no assumption , as is implicit in economic theory, that 
the market w ill find the rational choice, even if  no one in the marketplace 
does. Here is the heart of the thesis: The voter w ill not tend in general 
toward rationality in the traditional sense because the the information on 
which his decisions depend w ill be filtered through a very few sources in 
a given area of interest. The information source, however, w ill have a wide 
variety of individuals seeking his information. Thus he has an effic ient, 
consistent estimator of the truth— the type of estimator the individual has 
lost, “his section w ill explain why this is so.
Scitovsky lists several market characteristics favorable to competition.5 
They include a competitive spirit, large numbers of producers, similarity in 
relative strength, changing membership, and freedom of entry to and exit
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from the market. "rhe competitive spirit is defined as an absence of coopera­
tive spirit between the actors in the market. The actors do not act in collu­
sion to manipulate their output as a collective monopoly or cartel. Like 
Adam Smith's mistrustful entrepreneurs, Scitovsky's competitors find collusion 
impossible because each suspects that the others w ill break the agreement. 
Each moves to be the first to break the agreement, so greed draws the 
market price down to its equilibrium point. No judgment is made concern­
ing the virtue of the entrepreneurs; it is simply an observation on the na­
ture of competitive markets.
Scitovsky sees the other factors as institutional guarantors of competi- 
tion. Large numbers of actors make collusive agreements less possible be­
cause the costs of enforcing and arranging such agreements increase geo­
metrically as the number of actors increases algebraically. A reasonable 
similarity in size insures that no actor is strong enough to enforce agree­
ments on would-be competitors single-handedly. Changing membership in 
the market is said to increase competition because collusive agreements can 
be destroyed by the entry of a new competitor. Abive a l l ,  collusive agree­
ments require the stability of institutions, and changing membership destroys 
that stability. _rhus, barriers to entry are essential to the maintenance of 
collusive agreements.
Consider information to be a scarce commodity. Instead of collusive 
agreements manipulating the production and output of goods, it is the out­
put of information that is being controlled to the advantage of its in itial 
holders. The reporters described in Downs's model do not gather information
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from some great random pool, which would insure certain statistical properties, 
nor from an oracle who speaks only the truth. Data must be secured from 
individuals and from organizations (firms, unions, bureaus, etc . ) .  The report­
er trying to get information on the production of wheat is more or less 
guaranteed complete data; there are enough information sources to make 
that market competitive. Similarly, reporters can inform the public reason­
ably well on items like road repair bids. There are enough sources of informa­
tion in that market to enable publishers to gather information comprehensively. 
The reason is that probabilities dictate that it w ill be in some actor's interest 
to divulge almost any bit of information available. This is demonstrated 
effectively in the neoclassical economic model.
On the other hand, when information sources are few it can be expec­
ted that some manipulation w ill occur, just as it can be expected that where 
few producers of a good exist, they w ill be exploit to exploit this advantage 
over consumers. An example can be found in recent controversies concerning 
the long-term effects of some chemicals. Firms have withheld information 
from the government and from consumers and even from their own workers
7
because of profit motives. Only the individual firms held the information 
showing the dangers of their products, so they were information monopolists.
A particular individual in society might prefer to allow a small amount of 
chemical dumping in exchange for the benefits of the product if  he were 
fully informed. But, because the company offers him information regarding 
the benefits but not the true costs in terms of environmental and health
effects, he votes to allow a greater amount of dumping. In this way, the 
firm is reaping a monopoly profit from its information advantage. Here 
profit is not derived from any monopoly on a physical resource.
Figure 7 utilizes the now-familiar probability distribution to demon­
strate this point graphically. Again,
R represents the level of x (here
p w
the amount of chemicals to be 
dumped ) he would choose under 
perfect information, “he first 
probability distribution represents 
his in itial decision function, show­
ing a high degree of uncertainty on
Figure 7
his part. At this point, he is not
very knowledgeable on the subject of chemical dumping.
The second probability distribution represents his curve after he has 
gathered more information . However, at the level of complexity he has 
now sought, much of the information he desires can only come from the 
firm itself. Therefore, his distribution begins to skew toward the position I 
taken by the firm, which naturally wishes to dump a great deal of chemical 
“he third distribution represents the individual's function after he has read 
a great deal on the subject. However, most of the later data on which 
he based his choice came from the firm so it was strategically filtered 
to bias it toward the firm's position. Because he has essentially been re­
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ceiving propaganda, his position is biased toward the firm's position. Thus, 
no conceivable amount of information expenditure w ill lead him to a 
rational decision. If his funds were unlimited, he could set up his own lab­
oratory and run his own tests, but that is not a feasible option. The report­
ers on whom he relies for information are now inconsistent estimators of the 
truth.
The next task is to categorize those types of information markets which
should tend to enable reporters to report consistently and those which should
produce increasingly biased information as more information is gathered. For
this, we return to Scitovsky.
He describes a dichotomy (or continuum) between an "informed market"
and an'Uninformed market." These are defined as follows:
The informed market is a market in which the average buyer knows 
enough about the quality of the goods and services offered to ap­
praise them on their own merits without relying on trade-marks, ad­
vertisements, or the reputation of the producers or se lle rs ...In  general 
one might say that the market for any good whose appraisal requires 
little  or no technical, chemical, medical, or other specialized 
knowledge, or requires knowledge that is quickly and easily acquired, 
is an informed market.8
A market is uninformed when the average buyer in the market has an 
incomplete idea of the nature of the goods or services he buys, and 
judges their quality not by his own standards, but on the basis of 
advertising and indexes of quality. By index of quality, we m ean ... 
anything by which the uninformed buyer is likely to judge quality.9
The tendency toward the unknown market w ill result from the advent of
high technology, scale economies, and other factors likely to prevent the
consumer from making a rational choice. Considering this concept in the
government arena, the problem is as follows: An informed market is one in
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which the voter is qualified to judge the performance of his elected officials 
directly or at least where reporters are able to do so and are forced to re­
veal the most accurate possible information because of competition. This might 
involve street repairs versus lower taxes. A relatively competitive news- 
gathering system in this informed market can convey rather well what the 
costs of repair should be. The average citizen, unable to estimate the costs 
himself, can nevertheless reach a close approximation in this way. "he more 
he reads, the more he knows.
"he uninformed market for government is illustrated by the choice among 
advanced military systems. The voter is unable to judge by any standards of 
his own whether one system is better than any other. He cannot, acting 
alone, determine how much must or should be spent on defense.10 He must 
depend on information gathered by others, some of whom are acting under a 
cloak of offic ially  sanctioned secrecy, and many of whom have an economic 
or political stake in the outcome. Typically, the reports w ill reach him through 
the media. Unfortunately, there are bottlenecks throughout this network of 
news-gathering. Members of Congress might be at the mercy of what Dwight 
Eisenhower termed the military-industrial complex. There may be a consensus
among defense industry and military leaders concerning which information to
11
release. Secrecy prevents other contractors from competing effectively for 
contracts, even in competitors are available. Where bottlenecks of informa­
tion occur, private motives might be expected to override public motives.
A military leader who is the acknowledged expert on a particular weapons
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system may have a personal interest in seeing that system preserved, even if  
more efficient alternatives are available. Perhaps patriotism or other forms of 
altruism might prevail over the private motive, but here the point is that this 
need not be the case. In fact, the later section on cognitive biases w ill show 
how such a person might support retaining a weapons system whose obsolescence 
threatens national security even if he does not mean to do so. An explanation 
w ill be offered.
Scitovsky observes that free competition requires freedom of entry into
1 2occupations and professions. Under specialization, the freedom of entry to 
and exit from them become severely limited. Workers require lengthy training 
to perform their jobs. As the length of training time increases with high 
technology, workers feel less able to change jobs because of the necessity 
of starting at the bottom of an organization once more. Even in assembly- 
line operations where the ultimate specialization reduces training time by 
breaking tasks down into the simplest operations, those in management re­
quire still greater knowledge of their industry because they must oversee so 
many operations. The fear of losing one's managerial job leads to a protective
1 3mentality in complex organizations— the familiar turf defenses of bureaucracy.
The relationship between information competitiveness and specialization 
may be a simple arithmetic one. In a highly complex, bureaucratized society 
there may simply not be enough reporters to go around— not enough agents in 
a specialty to insure valid comparisons of quality. In the economic market­
place, the result is the replacement of valid quality comparison techniques
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with artific ia l methods. This may include superficial differentiation like car 
style changes, non informative advertising, and the development of artific ia l
14
quality indexes (e .g . price). Similar characteristics can be seen in the 
political market. The individual voter finds himself confounded by the com­
plexity of the issues he must consider. He is unable to determine rationally 
the differences between political candidates and turns to superficial means of 
judging— rhetoric, gossip, physical appearance, candidate's fam ily, endorse­
ments, noninformative advertising, e tc . Similarly, elected officials experience 
the same difficulties in trying to determine the relative virtues of public
policy alternatives. A Congressman relies on his own set of reporting systems
1 5*o inform him. The bureaucracy expands to provide this reporting system.
Bureaucratic theory has shown how this may lead to a profusion of information
1 6
bottlenecks and the familiar bureaucratic atrophy can result.
In this section, it has been shown that the data reaching people may 
be biased due to structural features in the information market. This can be 
considered analogous to the market for goods because in both, a scarce 
commodity is being distributed by producers according to perceptions of 
self-interest, and the structure of the market.
Scitovsky lists a number of structural features conducive to competition. 
In the absence of these features, a market is susceptible to monopolistic 
exploitation. An information monopolist may try to deceive the consumer by 
strategically biasing information in a way that hides true costs and benefits 
of a particular action. In such cases, the individual's "rational" choice may 
be skewed away* from that choice he would make if  perfectly informed. At
the root of the monopolizing of information is the complexity brought about 
by technology and specialization. The less the individual is able to comprehend 
the facts relevant to his choices, the more likely he w ill be susceptible to 
information manipulation. !n such cases, he w ill turn to false benchmarks to 
aid him in judging qualitative questions. Not only is the citizen susceptible 
to these problems; political officials too must rely on monopolized sources of 
information.
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Chapter 5 
Collusion and Parallelism
The arguments up to this point have centered on those situations in_ 
which information affecting citizens' rational choices has been controlled 
by a single monopolist. It can be argued that such situations are rare, that 
any information is generally available to more than one source. Supposedly, 
competitive forces should overcome systematic biases, but here it is argued 
that they do not. Where data sources have a higher probability of rational 
choice than consumers of data, it can be expected that they w ill manipulate 
information according to self-interests. Where two or more actors have access 
to the same information, they can be expected to act in collusive or parallel 
fashion if  an agreement, overt or tac it, can be reached and enforced. The 
case is like an oligopolistic economic market.
Oligopoly can be called the most "political" form of economic market; 
it is one in which the interplay between actors most closely resembles political 
bargaining. No attempt is made here to apply oligopoly models directly to 
political situations. They are presented only to suggest past attempts at model­
ling the actions of the few.
The political-oligopolistic nexus is implied by the identifying characteris­
tics of the latter. These center about the small number of actors able to 
visibly affect the market. While there may be thousands of actors, only those
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few with this market power are defined as the oligopolists. There is strategic 
interplay between these actors, because they are aware that the decisions of 
each w ill affect the decisions of the others. They may recognize large areas 
of shared interests where a ll maximize gains by acting in harmony. Where 
they have at least partially conflicting interests, the resulting competition 
is likely to decay into a rivalry of conflicting w ills . Actions take on a game­
like quality with optimizing actions taking the form of moves based on expec­
tations of the responses of others in the market, a situation very different 
from the classic competition.
There is a great similarity between this type of economic market and 
the arena of political interplay. In the latter, the number of actors is almost 
always small, whether they are nations, candidates, lobbying groups, political 
parties, or individuals. While there may be thousands of individuals writing 
letters or fighting in armies, or participating in some way in the political 
interplay, the number of primary actors whose decisions dictate the course of 
events is generally small. They recognize this strategic nature of their de­
cisions. Lobbyists for one side of an issue calculate the likely response of 
their opponents to each possible course of action. Nations calculate the 
probable moves of rival nations in response to their own moves. Political 
campaigns are plotted as carefully as games of chess. Throughout politics, 
conflicts are defined by the tests of w ill and strengths and weaknesses of 
actors whether persons or groups.
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Economic theories of oligopoly are concerned with the ways In which 
actors come to recognize the mutuality of their interests and the strategies 
they employ in arriving at agreements on serving these mutual interests. 
Cartel theory considers the increasing difficulty of negotiating and enforcing 
agreements between actors as their numbers increase. 2 To date, no one 
theory of oligopoly is widely favored by economists, and some argue that 
to develop a universal theory is not possible. The existing ones used for 
empirical observations consider the rates at which firms provide goods in 
the marketplace. Similarly, this chapter outlines the strategies of informa­
tion dissemination given a limited number of sources.
If a political market includes several actors with conflicting interests, 
why w ill they not lead society to an optimum through their rivalry? Why 
won't a regulatory agency's conflict with an industry lead to a social opti­
mum? Why won't the rivalry between Republicans and Democrats lead the 
individual to a rational choice? The answer lies in the weakness of what 
Galbraith termed "countervailing powers," a weakness which w ill be called 
here "the bifurcation of the political market into competitive and coopera­
tive axes.
Consider diagrams 8 through 12. In Figure 8, there is the probability 
distribution for voter i on Policy x , and it is assumed that there is a great 
deal more information available to i than he already possesses. !n Figure 
9 , he has received some information from a source whose self-interest lies 
in maximizing the quantity of x , and his probability function has become 
biased toward the direction of the information source. In Figure 10, there
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is a competitive force whose interest lies in minimizing x . The countervail­
ing power may be a rival political party or interest group * a regulatory 
agency, or any other competitive force. Rivalry between the two interests 
might be expected to lead the voter to a rational choice by allowing him, 
as in P2M ,  toward R. In Figure 11, though, the two sources have recognized 
points of mutual interest, and the market has bifurcated into two axes. Along 
axis x , the two are still in conflict— there is no area for collusive actions. 
Here the voter receives the totality of information, so his decision should 
not be biased. On the z-axis (which would be perpendicular to the paper) 
the two sources have recognized mutual interests on which they collude or 
act in paraHel fashion. Along this axis, the release of information to 
society w ill be of an indeterminate nature. If the two rivals are able to 
reach an overt or tacit agreement, then voters w ill receive biased information. 
If they are unable to agree, as *n Figure 12, where collusion fails, the two 
w ill be rivalrous on both axes and all information w ill be unbiased. The 
way the rivals w ill agree to collude or w ill fail to is indeterminate. In 
economic oligopoly, markets and prices may resemble either competitive or 
monopolistic markets or anything between. Similarly, the solution of the 
political oligopoly may be either polar example or anything between.
There is a wide body of literature on the failure of competitve forces. 
Huntington's study of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) is a good
3
example. Representing his findings in terms of the above model , the 
railroad industry is viewed as the information source and the ICC the counter­
vailing power. In itia lly , the two acted as rivals, and their conflict led
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voters to relatively unbiased information . regarding the true costs of railroad 
service. Later, the industry and the agency came to recognize mutual inter­
ests which they were able to separate from those points on which their inter­
ests could not coincide. Huntington and others have argued the existence of 
a " life -c yc le " for regulatory agencies. In the beginning, there is a youth­
ful sense of purpose to the agency and it vigorously pursues its stated goals. 
Later, other self-interests dominate and the former rivals become allies in 
some areas of policy. The rivalry changes to a symbiotic relationship with 
both as mutual defenders of their now coincident interests. Over time, the 
purposes of the two have bifurcated into areas where collusion is advantageous 
and those where it is ro t. The economic literature of oligopoly offers some 
understanding of these processes.
Assume there are two information sources in some market. The information 
with which they deal is complex, and there are no other actors in the po lity 
able to confirm or refute their assertions. !f the two disseminate identical 
information, the individual's perception of the society's transformation curve 
should be biased in that direction. The two sources w ill seek to bias toward 
their view , and their ability  to do so depends on their ab ility  to understand 
his preferences. If the two are unable to agree on the way to bias him, then 
their information w ill conflict, and the result w ill approach a more competitive 
market.
Follwing are some economic models of oligopoly which suggest possible 
results of oligopoly situations;
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THE QUA SI -COMPETITIVE SOLUTION 5: This replicates the informa- 
tion quality which would exist if  there were a competitive market for 
information, "he rivals are unable to negotiate a collusive solution, so an 
unbiased bank of information is provided. An example may be the day a 
regulatory agency opens its doors. Its interests and that of the regulated 
industry seem directly opposite. There is an esprit de corps among the 
agency's employees, and their in itial desire is to provide a substitute for 
the missing competitive market. Though some mutuality of interests may be
recognizable at this stage, the agency does not exploit if  y e t.
6
THE COLLUSION SOLUTION : Here, the two agents have recognized 
the mutual interests and have begun to cooperate fully with each other, 
information is distributed through society as if  the colluding agents were a 
single entity. This is a sort of joint monopoly, a cartel of information. The 
solution might be experienced if  the two agents found they had no conflicting 
interests, for the existence of such conflicts provides a major obstacle to 
collusion, in economic theory, a major such obstacle is the difficulty in 
determining how the spoils of monopoly are to be divided among the 
partners, "hat question of division becomes a zero-sum game among the 
agents. The success of the agreement rests on the ability to suppress these 
areas of dispute beneath the overall purpose of self-interest, ^he !CC- 
railroad case can be cited as one in which the parties surcessfully reached 
a comfortable collusion.
7
THE COURNOT SOLUTION : Here, each actor maximizes his own 
good on the assumption that his moves w ill not affect those of his rivals.
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This is a naive assumption, but may resemble the truth in certain political 
situations where the rivals simply don't understand the psyches of each other. 
They are unable to collude effic iently , but recognize some mutual interests 
by trial and error. A case might be two ethnic groups who very slowly 
realize similar interests, but only through a long series of misunderstandings 
of the other's intentions in each move.
THE STACKLEBERG SOLUTION : This is a particularly "political"  
sort of oligopoly solution. Here it is asserted that there are two distinct 
types of agents, "followers" and "leaders." The follower obeys the assumptions 
the leader makes about him and follows accordingly. The leader assumes that 
the follower w ill behave as expected, but w ill allow the dominance of the 
leader and maximize his own utility accordingly. The leader is the one who 
determines where the policy (in this case information dissemination) w ill 
be and the follower makes the best of that situation. With duopolists, there 
are four possible outcomes.* 1) Agent 1 wants to be the leader and 2 wants 
to be the follower; 2) 2 desires to be ihe leader and 1 the follower; 3) both 
wish to be leaders; and 4) both wish to be followers. Solutions 1 and 2 
have determinate outcomes. The leader determines which information is 
disseminated, and foliwer accepts that decision and maximizes his own 
interests accordingly. !f both try to be followers, their behavior w ill be 
indeterminate and inconsistent until one chooses to be the leader. If both 
try to be leaders, there is another type of disequilibrium, one of warfare 
between the two until the dominance of one or the other is firmly established.
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THE MARKET SHARES SOLUTION 9 : This conjectures in economics 
that one rival may have as his goal maintaining his share of the market, 
irrespective of profit or other motives. It is assumed this is in some sense 
maximizing some longer term goal than simply maximizing profit. Political 
theorists may inquire accordingly whether political actors seek to preserve 
whatever "piece of the pie" they currently have. The bureaucratic turf 
protection mentioned earlier may be an empirical verification of this. Other 
interests of an agency seem to succumb to this long-term goal of agency 
perpetuation.
"HE KINKED-DEM AND-CURVE SO LU TIO N ;1 This holds that an 
oligopolistic market should tend to become rigid at some price. If a rival 
tries to undersell, his opponents lower prices in response, and no one is 
better off. !f he raises his prices, no one w ill buy from him and again he 
w ill be no better off. For analogy, we return to the information duopolists.
A rival w ill not divulge information to voters which w ill tend to move
the voter's choice farther from his own position. But, he might not divulge
information which would move the voter toward his position if  he expects 
that the rival w ill release information to move him back to his position,
a step detrimental to both rivals. A "truce" between the rivals is expected if
both know that warfare w ill result in a loss to both.
This chapter has shown several ways in which competitive forces in 
an information market might break down even if  more than one source on 
a particular subject exists. The theory of oligopoly in economics provides
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numerous models on the ways in which rivals come to recognize mutual 
interests, even in the presence of directly conflicting interests. Oligopoly 
theory, though, is ill-defined and offers no deterministic solutions. It 
offers only a variety of suggestions of how rivals act according to the 
interdependence of their actions. Oligopoly seems to share some traits with 
politics. All of the above-mentioned models except the cjuasi-competitive 
solution result in some exploitation of the information advantage to the 
detriment of the consumers (voters). The implication is that even bitter 
political rivals may still find some mutual interests to be jointly maximized 
at the expense of others.
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Chapter 6 
Biases in Cognitive Processes
Up to this point, the individual's deviation from rational choice has 
been assumed to result from institutional features. These have included the’ 
complexity of technology, the degree of labor specialization, the number 
of rivals in an area of interest, and the private motivations of information 
agents.
The section deals with another possible cause of deviation: the biases 
in an individual's cognitive processes. These may be present for a variety 
of reasons, some of which w ill be discussed in this chapter. The reasons 
include the following:
1) Data regarding the future Qre missing so it is inescapable that 
heuristic methods must be employed in predicting probable outcomes.
2) There is more information in any area than anyone can possibly
absorb.
3) There is conflicting information.
4) In a complex society, no individual can be knowledgable in more 
than a few areas.
This chapter w ill use the terminology of social psychology for its 
analysis. Social psychologists have hypothesized how different systems of 
information can affect individual decision-making.1 Here, we consider
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the cognitive processes which occur after information has reached the indi­
vidual. The/ may be thought of as a filtering mechanism he uses to reduce 
his information received down to a manageable level. Following are some 
of these processes and their attributes:
I fundamental attribution error: tendency to underestimate the impor­
tance of environmental factors and overestimate the importance of personali­
ties in occurrences
2)perceptual focusing: the object of focus is regarded as cause
3)advantages of self-presentation:^the perceived importance of the 
information source becomes an influence
4)availability: the relative ability  to extract needed information 
becomes a determinant of the decision
5)adjustment: the tendency to alter perceptions by rules
6 Representativeness: dominance of predictive qualities over actual 
probability weights
7)concreteness vs. abstractness: visually perceived characteristics 
appear to dominate those of a more abstract nature
8)persistence of theories: false in itial perceptions linger
9)congruity principle: the individual confuses his information and his
source
10)balance principle: the individual searches for a schematic regularity 
to his beliefs 11
I I  )cognitive dissonance: the individual tries to avoid allowing con­
flicting information to enter his decision process simultaneously 12
Each of the above can contribute to the biasing of information by 
the individual making his policy choices. For the model presented in this 
thesis, it is reasonable to suppose that a complex, specialized society can 
increase the problems making choices about optimal government.13 A 
society such as the United States at present is expected to present more 
information problems than (for example) the United States of the Eighteenth 
Century.
Ross describes the fundamental attribution error as follows:
(individuals) consistently and dramatically underestimated the extent
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to which subjects in general would yield to those situational 
forces which compelled obedience in Milgram's s itu a tio n ... 
they assumed that the particular subject's obedience reflected 
his distinguishing personal dispositions rather rather than the 
potency^  ^of situational pressures and constraints acting upon a ll 
subjects.
This might affect the polity as follows: Downs assumes a level of 
professional standards which force reporters to provide information bene­
fiting the individual and improving his ability  to make rational choices. 
However, if  Ross is correct, information sources may alter what they 
provide due to environmental pressures. Even a source known to be in 
sympathy with one viewpoint may provide information contrary to the 
interests of that side of the issue. For instance, a government official 
known to be a Democrat might testify in support of a Republican measure 
if  he thinks that might help him retain his job. In the Milgram experiments, 
subjects w illingly performed acts contrary to their moral beliefs due to 
pressure from the experimenters. The information source may be overly 
trusted by reporters and others when such trust is no longer deserved.
For reasons cited earlier, specialization can increase the environmental 
pressures on the information source.
Por the aliened officials In a democrdcy, the implication is that 
actions by parties and governments w ill be widely regarded as manifesta­
tions of free w ill rather than involuntary bending to environmental pressures. 
A concrete example is the case of an official who loses favor with the 
public over issues on which he has little  or no ability to choose between 
alternative actions. For example, some politicians' careers ended because
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they followed the edicts of U .S . Supreme Court on civil rights matters; 
their demise came even though they may personally have opposed the court
1 5
rulings and may have been helpless to oppose them. There are instances 
in which elected officials appear to have been blamed for natural occurrences 
far beyond their control.1
Perceptual bias should increase in the uninformed markets described 
by Scitovsky. The causes of events may become more obscure as the causes 
and the events become more complex. !n fact, the causes and events can 
become less distinguishable. Social psychology describes a problem of 
"perceptual focusing" in which the object of the individual's attention comes
1 7to be regarded as the source of some action. An example is the tendency 
to blame an administrator for the actions of an aberrant aide or for the 
failure of a program over whose success he had little  control.
In the society postulated by welfare economics and adopted by Downs
for theoretical purposes, the free market is the source of private goods and
1 8
the government is the source of public goods. Importantly the two are 
considered (in the context of the models) sharply distinct. A high technology 
society, though, may not lend itself to such sharp delineations. A division 
may occur between those responsible for an occurrence and those who re­
ceive the blame. The government may be blamed for actions over which 
it has no control while it may escape responsibility for actions over which
1 9
it has great control.
The oil crisis of the early 1970's can be cited as a case in point.
Some hold the elected officials in office in 1974 to blame for the gasoline
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lines, heating oil shortages, and related problems. Others blame the oil 
companies, others the OPEC nations. In truth, it is difficult to disentangle 
the facts from the fiction or to determine with any certainty who is to 
blame. If elected officials in the United States did not begin the crisis, 
then the voters should through some process realize this, according to the
rational actor hypothesis. It is-  not difficult to think of examples in which
2 0voters erred in judgment about such matters.
Similarly, the government officials are not necessarily able to divine 
rationally the truth about policy decisions. The process may go even farther 
as managerial specialists (in government and in the private sector) must 
rely on data supplied by underlings who may have their own private motives 
and accompanying information strategies. Ross describes the self-presentation
...im plications may be all too clear for our understanding of the 
social structures and of the forces that impede social change. Indi­
viduals who enjoy positions of power by accident of birth, favor­
able political treatment or even their own efforts also tend to enjoy 
advantages in self-presentation. Such individuals, and even their 
disadvantaged underlings, may greatly overestimate the extent to 
which the seemingly positive attribute^ 2of the powerful simply re­
flect the advantages of social control.
Indeed, this distortion in social judgment threatens to provide a 
particularly insidious brake upon social mobility whereby the disad­
vantaged and paperless overestimate the capabilities of the powerful, 
who in turn inappropriately deem their own caste well suited to the 
task of leadership.
The individual believes his political superiors more qualified to direct 
his life than is actually so. The official in government becomes additionally
biased as a result of this problem. He overestimates his ability to discern the
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transformation curve from the information he receives from his sources and 
reporters. On the other hand, the expertise of those sources and reporters 
leads the official similarly to overestimate those individuals' abilities. The 
entire information chain becomes laden with such bottlenecks, and each has 
the potential to originate, am plify, or cancel some bias.
Three heuristic problems may also bias information, especially in a 
complex society: availab ility , adjustment, and representativeness. A vailability  
bias concerns the stochastic nature of the information sample which the 
individual might choose as a basis for his decisions. If the totality of informa1 
tion (as represented by the transformation curve) is available to him, he must 
draw from it a very limited number of bits. O f course, the sampling may be 
biased by the withholding of information by sources. The sampling may be 
affected in other ways, like advertising, superficial information, lies, and 
various misleading techniques. Each is designed to affect the quantity and 
quality of information so the individual is led toward the source's view.
According to Ross, the adjustment heuristic is characterized by the 
individual making judgments by first adjusting to some in itia l value or by 
some partial computational procedure. He may anchor his views to some 
prior data, right or wrong. A political case is one in which an interest 
group drives to win allegiance to an ideal which is in itia lly  unassailable. 
Followers may adhere to this view later, even in the light of evidence
2 3to the contrary.
It thus becomes in the interests of the source to provide favorable, 
though misleading or false, information in the in itial time period, because
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it establishes what amounts to an ideological bunker. In our time , for 
instance, early support for the Nixon presidency enabled him to retain a 
strong core of followers even in the wake of the Watergate evidence.
Again, the more complex the issue at hand, the more likely such an 
inertia of old information might be.
i
The third heuristic bias, representativeness, concerns the tendency 
of individuals to give too much weight to the predictive qualities of 
information without considering the probability distribution. Ross presents 
the following case:
I (Ross) have a friend who is a professor. He likes to write poetry,
is rather shy, and is slight of stature. Which of the following is
his field: (a) Chinese Studies, or (b) psychology? 2h
He assumed that many would choose (a) from the qualities described. 
This is despite the obvious facts that there are far more psychologists in the 
United States than professors of Chinese Studies and Ross, as a psychologist, 
would be more likely to be personally acquainted with someone in his own 
profession. In statistical terms, he is arguing that where a Bayesian model 
is available, people irrationally ignore the prior probabilities?5
Abelson describes the same heuristic is somewhat different terms.26 
He asks the reader whether there are more words in English with the letter 
"k" in the first position or the th ird . Most say firs t, seemingly because 
they are trained to identify words by the first letter, not the third. Actually, 
he reveals, there are three times as many words with the "k" in the third 
place. The relation between these two definitions lies in the
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particular details most readily accessible to the thought processes. In one 
case, in itial letters are more accessible than thrid letters. In the other, 
cultural stereotypes are more accessible than demographic statistics.
This heuristic could be described as a numerical version of the availability  
heuristic.
"the political manifestation of this can be seen in advertising jand 
demagoguery feeding on biases rather than statistical facts.
Ross describes a related tendency which skews the person's decisions 
away from rational baselines. Someone might be more likely to listen to the 
advice of a friend than that of a consumer publication when purchasing an 
automobile. The journal would more likely provide information of an accurate 
nature, but like the in itial letter or the stereotype, the friend is somehow 
more comprehensible. Technological complexity offers a particularly troublesome 
fectuue: if this heuristic bias is believed. Highly complex innovations may 
require long periods of evaluation such that their true costs and benefits 
are not apparent until long after action is taken. If costs lag far behind 
the benefits, the former may seem more abstract, causing non-optimal de­
cisions. Jobs in the present may seem to outweigh the costs of pollution 
to be borne later. The prospect of unlimited energy at present may outweigh 
the expected costs of nuclear energy (externalities, e tc .) .  Present benefits 
of a drug (or of cigarettes or of a food additive) may seem to outweigh the 
costs, which seem abstract at present. Even Nineteenth Century liberals like 
John Stuart M ill believed in limiting the ability to make certain contracts 
over long periods of tim e. He opposed legalizing indentured servitude on the
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grounds that the individual, even a rational individual would tend to 
discount the future at too high a ra te .27
Ross describes "distortion" and "autonomy" as the perseverance mech­
anisms causing information flawed as above to linger in its biased fashion.28 
Distortion occurs where weights are improperly assigned to data because of 
cognitive failure. Autonomy is the characteristic which separates the biased 
information from its source. The social scientist must ask whether long run 
competitive factors w ill tend to equalize entities in the polity or whether 
autonomous characterstics w ill lead to greater disparity of power in society.
!f relative power tends to increase, then complex systems of complex informa­
tion w ill tend to lead the polity away from a normative goal of equality or 
equity. If it is the former and power tends to equalize in the long run, the 
question for the social scientist concerns the length of the long run. If the 
lag between benefits and costs stretches out over generations, then the polity 
may not have sufficient competitive forces to lead the individual to a 
rational choice.
Here, we have touched briefly on a few of the ways biases may 
appear as a result of cognitive limitations. Social psychology names other 
biases, but this chapter has at least touched the surface of some of the 
more important hypotheses about cognitive biases. The conclusion drawn is 
that a major obstacle to rational decision-making lies in the limitations 
on the volume of data anyone can consume and the makeshift methods used 
to sor' out what has been received. The political implications w ill be dealt 
with more fully in the next chapter, but here is its essence: If the individual
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has a limited number of sources from which to get information on a 
particular subject, his decision-making w ill be subject to great variance 
because competitive forces are not present. On the other hand, if  the 
information source has many individuals desiring his information, then 
their competition for the data is likely to provide him with with a good 
estimator of the value of his information. Thus the source w ill approximate 
rational choice while those seeking his data w ill not. Individuals are 
susceptible susceptible to monopolization by information sources. The 
monopolist can exert his market power by withholding information or by 
estimating the preferences and perceptions of individuals. If he can calcu­
late the ways in which individuals bias the information they receive, his 
advantage becomes greater. This is one explanation of polling and market­
ing analysis. xhe source is at an advantage because in a particular area 
of interest he deals with a large number of people while the purchaser 
choosing among competitors has only a small number to choose from (in 
statistical sampling terms). The voter has to get information from the 
sources while they do not need his information specifically; he is only 
necessary in the sense of being part of a collective body of consumers.
The result is a distinct advantage for the monopolist of information.
In this and preceding chapters, we have tried to show how a 
single individual may be led away from a rational decision by weaknesses 
in the system of information upon which he relies. It has been assumed 
that the individual has a well-defined set of preferences, represented by 
an indifference map. The variance in his decision-making has been blamed
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on his perceptions about society's transformation curve— a geometric repre­
sentation of the set of all possible policy combinations available to the 
polity . Biases in his information gathering system can be divided into two 
types: those resulting from manipulation of the information reaching him, 
and those resulting from biasing patterns of cognitive processes. Competition 
between information sources reduces the variance of the individual's decision 
from what he would choose under perfect information. Lack of competition 
increases the variance because he has less basis for comparison and more 
biased information. This lack of competition arises from an increasing 
division of labor, specialization of tasks, increased education length needed 
for particular duties, complex organization ,and technology. Even where 
more than one source exists, there may be exploitation o f the voter due to 
collusion and parallelism. The theory of oligopoly provides a guide to under­
standing those problems.
Biases in the individual's decision-making can also result from the 
limitations of his cognitive processes. Social psychologists have hypothesized 
a number of such biases. Many could be useful in a theory of democracy. 
Here, these processes have only been briefly considered. Cognitive processes 
can be represented by statistical models, and in fact, a major contribution 
of mathematical information theory has been the reshaping of the science of 
behavior. The problems, as they relate to the political model, may be 
stated as follows: the mind, like the statistician, seeks to learn the most 
from the least information necessary. This is done by developing a number 
of means of analyzing data. Over the life of the person, he seeks to find
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the most efficient possible system. As in statistics, the same estimators are 
not always equally va lid . We would argue here that some cognitive 
processes, developed over centuries, have become antiquated with the 
explosion of information in this century. Whether or not information processing 
has advanced as quickly as the need for it is subject to question.
Next, the thesis is concluded with an analysis of the systematic 
effects of these biases on the polity as a whole.
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Note to Chapter 6
1. A number of research areas are outlined in Leonard Berkowitz, ed. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology vol. 10 (New York: 
Anderson Press, 1977).
2 . Lee Ross, "The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Dis­
tortions in the Attribution Process, 11 in Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, pp. 173-220; E .E . Jones and R .E. Nisbett, "The 
Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Be­
havior, " in E.E. Jones et a l . ,e d s . ,  Attribution Perceiving the Causes 
of Behavior (Morristown, N .J . :  General Learning Press, 1971); and 
H .H . Kelley, "Attribution in Social Interaction," in Attribution .‘Per­
ceiving.
3 . Ross, p. 183.
4 . Ib id ., p. 184.
5 . Ibid, pp. 198 ff.; and A . Tversky and D . Kahneman, "Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," Science 185 (7974), pp. 
1124-1131.
6 . Ross, pp. 798 ff.; and Tversky and Kahneman, pp. 17 24-1137 .
7 . Ross, pp. 200ff.; D . Kahneman and A . Tversky, "Subjective
Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness," Cognitive Psychology 3
(1972), pp. 430-454; and D . Kahneman and A . Tversky, "On the Psy­
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chology of Prediction,'1 Psychological Review80 (1973), pp. 237-251.
8 . Ross, pp. 200ff.; and R. E. Nisbett, E. Borgida, R. Crandell,
and H . Reed, "Popular Induction: Information Not Always Informative," 
in J . Carroll and J. Payne, eds. Cognitive and Social Behavior (Potomac, 
M d.: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, 1976).
9-.- Ross, p. 208.
10. R. P. Abelson, "Social Psychology's Rational M an," in G .W .  
Mortimore and S. I .  Benn, eds., The Concept of Rationality in the 
Social Sciences (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1974), pp. 58 -89 .
11. Ibid.
12. Ross, p. 186.
13. Downs, p. 230.
14. Ross, p. 184; and S. Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience,"
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67 (1963), pp. 371-378.
15. For example, see Francis M . W ilhoit, The Politics of Massive
Resistance (New York: George Braziller, 1973), p . 159.
16. See T . Morgenthau and F. M aier, "The Politics of Snow," News­
week, February 19, 1979, p. 34; and J. R. Coyne, J r ., "Snow Job:
The Politics of Anger," National Review, April 27, 1979, pp. 532-3 .
17. Ross, p. 193.
18. Downs, p . 20.
19. Libertarians would consider this the usual case. See, for example,
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chi­
cago Press, 1962), pp. 196-202.
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20. Just which election falls into this category is a matter of personal
choice, but any campaign in which a candidate lost through a "smear" 
or false association can be cited.
21 . Abe Ison, p. 57.
22. Ibid.
23; Ross, pr. 198.
24. Ib id ., p. 199.
25. A Bayesian model is one in which prior probabilities drawn from
past data are used in predicting the future.
26. Abe Ison, p. 58.
27. John Stuart M il l ,  On Liberty, ed. Currin V . Shields (New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, In c ., 1956), p. 125.
28. Ross, p. 206.
Chapter 7
Relation to the Spatial Competition Model
Thus far, discussion has largely dealt with the effects of information 
problems on a single individual. Here we consider the cumulative effects on 
society as a whole. Again, the basis for discussion is the single-issue policy 
continuum for X . This can again represent one issue in isolation or Downs's 
ideological spectrum. Either uses the same Hotelling model.
Figure 13 shows a population distribution in which n -  1 individuals 
lie in fixed positions along the continuum. The x-axis represents the policy 
choice while the y-axis represents the number of individuals at that point. 
To simplify the discussion for now, it is assumed that there is a two-party 
system and that everyone votes. The policy level chosen is the median of 
this distribution. For this reason, the particular shape of the distribution is 
not a concern.
If an n-th individual is added to the population, the position of the 
median w ill shift s lightly , unless n is located at that point exactly. In a 
large society, his effect on the median is slight, but not zero. He has an 
infinitesimal but real effect on the policies chosen by the parties. Assume 
that the original n -  1 people have fixed views; n is the only question 
mark for the parties. Figure 14 shows two possible probability distributions 
for n's choice. One is a normal distribution around the point he would
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choose under perfect information. The second distribution shows a distribution 
biased in the direction of an information source upon whom n's decision 
depends. Perhaps the information source investigated individual n and 
calculated an information strategy most likely to skew his distribution in this 
direction. Perhaps they purchased his name from an ideologically oriented 
publication and figured that he was of that persuasion. Then information. . 
was given to influence someone with that viewpoint. The biases described 
in the previous chapters have been developed by marketing analysts, perhaps. 
N may still choose his rational point; the point is still within his distribution. 
But, in the second distribution, the source has moved to decrease that 
probability. If we assume that the parties have perfect information (by polling 
or other technique) then both w ill scurry to the new median point. The 
median of society could be exactly where it was before, but there is a high 
degree of probability that it w ill be slightly closer to the position of the 
information source.
Several additional diagrams illustrate the cumulative effects of the 
information source affecting the distributions of many individuals in the way 
described above. In Figure 15, many individuals have been led by the source 
to probability distributions like n's in the previous diagram. Now, instead of 
an infinitesimal shift, there is a major one. If there is a large number of 
individuals, the population distribution should resemble a vertical summation 
of a ll individual probability distributions. This makes possible a variety of 
different solutions. It is possible (though improbable) that each individual 
w ill select the rightmost point in his distribution, in which case the society's
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median (and government choice) w ill be far to the right. Now, the choice 
of society also becomes a probability distribution which is a function of all 
the individual curves.
The population distribution need not be normal or any other common 
distribution. Figure 16 shows a bimodal distribution. Consider the issue of 
defense spending: the two modes can be termed "hawks" and "doves" with 
a continuum of shadings, represented here on the right and le ft, respectively. 
Assume there is a strong dominance of information disseminated by the hawks. 
Many probability curves shift to the right, swelling the hawk side of the 
spectrum as in Figure 17. Here, the doves are portrayed as responding in­
effectively, so one mode shrinks and the other grows. The distribution and 
hence the median shifts to the right. Figure 18 shows an alternative possibili­
ty . ^he hawk mode swells as before, but the doves respond more effectively, 
so that mode grows, too. This represents a polarizing of the electorate.
This may represent a reaction against the information given by the m ilitary. 
The leftward swelling may also represent what Robert Dahl called "slack re­
sources." 1 This refers to the phenomenon of politically inactive people 
becoming active when their viewpoint is threatened by opposing political 
forces.
Downs does not explicitly recognize this skewing of information, 
but some normative theorists have. Some others assume, as Downs does, 
that forces in the democratic polity tend to equalize in the long run.3 
By pressures like slack resources, the polity is kept toward its true median. 
This argument broke down for the individual, and it can do the same for
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the polity as a whole if:
1) Society's true possibilities (the transformation curve) remains hidden 
from the electorate because of information manipulation, or
2) Even awareness of the existence of desired information by opposing 
groups may not counteract fully if  one side is more successful than the other 
in disseminating information.
Hawks may shift the curve to the right because for some reason the 
doves may be less effective at disseminating facts. Though the latter may 
know the information favorable to their view they are unable to speak loudly 
enough, in a figurative sense.
Galbraith discussed this at length in American Capitalism and in other
if
later works, !n that book, he postulated that there would be areas of policy 
in which competition would be insufficient to prevent a superiority of power 
on one side or another. He suggested the state establishment of "counter­
vailing powers"— institutions designed to serve in a capacity like regulatory 
agencies. In Economics and the Public Purpose he recommended the establish­
ment of price-setting mechanisms within the government to serve as competi-
5
tion where none would form spontaneously.
This view has been criticized as merely a restatement of support for 
increased regulatory activ ity . This activity has been criticized on questions 
of efficiency. Figures 19 and 20 demonstrate tendencies of regulatory 
agencies. In the former, the information source at I has successfully biased 
the population distribution toward its opinion. !h the latter, a regulatory 
agency has been established as a countervailing power. The agency is at a
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disadvantage compared with the information source. It is not an equal 
partner in this market. Scitovsky cited relatively equivalent power as a
g
necessary component of competition. The agency's function is basically 
negative, unlike the controlled organization.
The agency may be founded on a purpose to which its employees 
may be dedicated. However, effectiveness may be short-lived. The thrust 
of the writings of Huntington and others is that the life  of a successful 
agency is usually fairly brief. Before too many years past, the bifurcation 
described earlier occurs, and the agency ceases to carry out its assigned 
purpose.
In this chapter, the information problems facing the individual have 
been generalized to a polity of many individuals. The thrust of the argument 
has been that individuals erring in their choices need not "average out" to 
a rational choice as Downs seems to suggest w ill happen.
In the following summary, the results of this thesis w ill be reviewed.
D(x) D_(x) from Fig. 19~vD(x)
x
Figure 20Figure 19
Lack of competition biases Regulatory agency reduces but
population distribution does not eliminate bias
Notes to Chapter 7
See the discussion of actual versus potential political resources 
In Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
I9 6 1 ),"c h . 24.
Recall the discussion on Chapter 6 on cognitive biases. Also, the 
Institutional School in economics has written extensively on this supposed 
tendency. See Galbraith, The Affluent Society, chs. 9 , 10, 11; and 
John Kenneth G albraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton 
M ifflin  C o ., 1967), chs. 18, 19, 20.
Downs, pp. 8 -11 .
John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism (Boston: Houghton 
M ifflin  C o ., 1952).
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Houghton M ifflin  C o ., 1973).
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Chapter 8 
Summary
This thesis has taken exception with the assumption of rationality as 
an approximation for collective behavior in a polity. The reason is that the 
possible existence of biases in the way people absorb information may cause 
their choices to deviate severely from what they would choose in a state of 
perfect information. It is argued that these biases may be systematic and thus 
not "average out" as the rational actor model would imply. Further, it is 
argued that these biases might occur most severely in the presence of a high 
degree of specialization, dependence upon expert opinion for information, 
and lengthy time horizons for the effects of choices.
The thesis has been presented in the form of a critique of Anthony 
Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy. This book, considered a seminal 
work in the field of positive political theory, was outlined Chapter 1 .
The questions considered in the thesis and the methods employed in the 
critique are outlined in Chapter 2 . The critique begins with an explanation 
of the significance of the rational actor in theory. Chapter 3 considers the 
construct and adds a particular form of uncertainty to the model. This is 
done to enable analysis of situations in which the individual deviates from 
rational choice. Competition and its role as a process for disseminating 
information are considered in Chapter 4 . This includes a discussion of the
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failure of competition in certain markets and the effect of this failure on 
decision-making. Chapter 5 argues that where competitive forces fa il, it 
should be expected that information sources w ill collude or act in parallel 
fashion at the expense of those needing the information. Chapter 6 lists 
a number of hypothetical ways an individual may bias the information he 
receives. A number of heuristic methods are considered. Chapter 7 considers 
the effects of these information problems on a polity of many individuals, 
arguing that under certain circumstances, systematic biases should occur.
The choice of An Economic Theory of Democracy as the subject of 
the critique is justified by several reasons. The work has been considered by 
some theoreticians to be the best of its genre.1 It forms the point of de­
parture for a sizable number of other works of positive political theory and
2
the theory of the economics of social choice. The book is representative 
of a large body of political and economic theory in its use of the rational 
individuality assumption, the self-interest axiom , and treatment of informa­
tion in some ways as a homogeneous commodity which, if  supplied costlessly, 
w ill necessarily increase the individual's expected u tility .
The argument of this thesis is that theory of this type has been un­
able thusfar to incorporate into models a number of the key determinants of 
policy. These include large organizations (bureaucratic, corporate, e tc .) ,  
specialization of the labor force, heterogeneity of information, parallel 
actions by large numbers of individuals, and deliberate biasing of informa­
tion without sufficient information to the contrary being obtainable.
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The theoretical construct of the rational Individual has been a useful 
tool In the analysis of certain types of economic markets and polities. It is 
not without its limitations, though. It may be useful in situations in which 
information is fairly simple (the cost of repairing shovels, the expected 
yield of a crop under given circumstances, e tc .) . But, the true costs and 
benefits of building nuclear power plants>~ medical research, funding of 
various long-term government programs, and genetic engineering are not 
clear to laymen and probably not even to experts. Since the individual must 
rely on experts for this information, his decisions may be biased in the direc­
tion of their opinions or what he perceives to be their opinions; d? in the case 
of distrust, he may be biased improperly away from their opinions. It is not 
difficult to make the case that the interests of laymen and experts w ill not 
always coincide. Where their interests diverge can determine how the formers' 
utilities are affected by information problems. The expert may have the 
ability both to bias the information the layman receives and to predict the 
manner in which the layman's heuristic processes w ill further bias information 
received. The individual may be relatively powerless at times to combat this 
susceptibility.
Implicit in much of information theory is a belief that "more is better."  
In other words, if an individual is given an additional costless increment of 
information, it is assumed that ceteris paribus his expected utility  w ill be at 
least as high, and possibly higher than before. However, situations can be 
shown where this is not true. An individual deciding whether or not to have
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surgery has some expected u tility , given the information structure from which 
his decision probabilities are derived. If he can get a costless increment of 
information, it w ill be likely to come from a doctor. If advice from the 
medical profession as a whole is biased , increasing his amount of information 
may only bias his decision further. Additional information may lower his 
expected u tility— a proposition seldom seen in the economic literature of _ 
information. Conceivably, if  an infinite amount of costless advice were avail­
able to the individual, he could go to medical school and found a research 
center to help in his decision-making. But, this is not feasible, so small 
increments of information must suffice.
This thesis has defined the systematic biases in’ the polity as occurring 
either in the structure of the information itself or in the way individuals in 
society interpret the information they receive. The first occurs if the information 
the individual receives, randomly processed, would lead him to an expected 
decision other than his preference under perfect information. The second bias, 
primarily heuristic, leads the individual to bias even in itia lly  unbiased informa­
tion.
Either of these tendencies to systematically bias the individual's choice 
can be manipulated by an information source more knowledgable in some 
aspect of the transaction . Furthermore, the self-interest axiom would lead us 
to believe that if this can be done, it w ill whenever the interests of the 
source come into play.
The argument can be made that these systematic biases might become 
more severe given certain situations. Increased specialization could be a
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source of bias since individuals would tend to know more about their own 
occupations and less about the occupations whose products bear directly on 
their u tility . Longer time horizons for technology would also be a conceivable 
source of bias. The realities of modern technology are such that estimating 
the true long term costs and benefits of particular policies becomes less and 
less exact.
The problems involved here bear especially on economic and positive 
political models which use tacit or explicit assumptions concerning the com­
petitiveness of the information sources in society. The social benefit of 
competition can be interpreted as the providing of a conflicting mass of 
information out of which the individual can derive a more advantageous 
choice than might otherwise be possible. Monopoly in production or infor­
mation or political power may have as its greatest cost the stifling of the 
forces of intellectual conflict which determine the possibilities for society.
No attempt is made here to determine the relative advantages of 
particular levels of technology and specialization. The point made by this 
thesis is that the realities of these factors require fundamentally different 
ways of studying society's institutions and processes.
A large firm may not perform as just a large version of a small firm .
A technology whose effects extend for centuries may require a different kind 
of scrutiny than one whose time horizon is a year or two. Near total reliance 
of individuals on the information provided by experts may not average out 
to the perfect information solution. In the presence of technologies, informa-
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tion becomes a highly heterogeneous commodity, and the way individuals 
and society as a whole process it becomes crucial in the determination of 
policy and transactions.
The problems of information biases discussed here may be of an 
especially severe nature in a political setting as opposed to an economic 
setting. In economic markets, it can be argued, the true costs and benefits 
may at least be approximated by the price system, excess supplies and 
demands, profits, and other measurable quantities. Determining and defining 
political successes and failures is a far more elusive task. The logic of 
voters and politicians in such a "market11 is based on decisions made under 
circumstances of great uncertainty and variance of perception. The "commodi­
ties" purchased by the voter are highly amorphous goods, if  they can be 
called that. The voter is uncertain, as Downs states, of the politician's 
true beliefs, policies, abilities, and other qualities. . Unlike the purchase of 
a simple economic good, comparison of entire ideologies might be subject 
to a variance too great for the rationality model. Similarly, the decisions 
of the politicians are made under circumstances of wide uncertainty.
There is no a priori reason to believe the decisions of those in 
political markets approximate rational decision-making. Reasons have been 
offered why the system w ill tend to be biased. The implication is that if 
a theoretician believes the rational individual model provides a closer 
approximation of the truth than other models, then it should be used. If 
not, a better approximation should be sought.
Thus, the intention of this thesis has been to suggest a direction in
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which research could move in politics and economics. The intention is also 
to suggest that without accounting for these significant factors, models w ill 
continue to have far less explanatory power than they could.
In particular, the direction suggested is the inclusion in positive 
political models certain aspects of information theory and social psychology. 
Information theory can provide a probabilistic basis with which to hypothe­
size the arguments of the thesis. Social psychology suggests several areas in 
which these hypotheses might be developed. The result can be models signifi­
cantly richer in analytical power than those currently in existence, and if so, 
they w ill have served some useful purpose in providing closer approximations of 
fact.
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Notes to Chapter 8
1 . See comments Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists, and Demo­
cracy (London: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 24; and Karl W . 
Deutsch, "Quantitative Approach to Political Analysis: Some Past 
Trends and Future Prospects," in Hayward P. A lker, J r .,  Karl W . 
Deutsch, and Antoine H . Stoetzel, eds., Mathematical Approaches 
to Politics (Washington: Jossey-Bass, In c ., Publishers, 1973), p. 1.
2 . For example, Barry, Sociologists, ch. 2; and Gordon Tullock,
Toward a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1967), ch. 4 .
APPENDIX
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The following economic terms are defined and described at length in 
Edwin Mansfield, Economics: Principles, Problems, Decisions, 2nd ed. (New  
York: W .W . Norton and Company, In c ., 1977).
Economic term —
Collusion.............................................
Competition........................................
Consumer.............................................
Demand Curve....................................
Equilibrium...........................................
Indifference curves (map) ...........
M arket.................................................
Monopoly.............................................
O ligopoly.............................................
Product Transformation C u rv e .. . .
Rational Choice...............................
Specialization (division of labor)
Supply Curve......................................
U tility ...................................................
W elfare.................................................
Pages in Mansfield
5917^ 3-94 
50, 59, 84, 535-40, 556-63 , 569-71 , 
577, 581-82, 592-95, 601-2 , 613-14, 
621-26, 662, 685-97
58, 60, 69, 83, 111, 461-80, 501-02  
29, 60 -61 , 66 -68 , 97 -98 , 484-505, 
565-6 , 584-86, 621-25, 638-40  
64-67
474-76, 505
59, 60 -63 , 75 -76 , 84
418, 556, 563-74, 577, 581-82, 598- 
603, 662
556, 577, 583-96, 600-01 
43 -49 , 112-13, 390-91, 713-14  
469 
21-22
62-63 , 540-42, 559-61 
464-65, 475-76  
692-93, 695-97
The following statistical terms can be found in Judith D . Handel, 
Introductory Statistics for Sociology (Englewood C liffs -N  .J .:Prentice-H all, 
In c ., 1978).
Biased Estimators......................................  295, 302
Efficient Estimators....................................  295-96
M ean........................................................ 103-4, 199-200, 217
Probabilities.................................................  243-80
Skew............................................................ .. 84, 294-95
Variance........................................................ 103-04, 199-200, 217
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